On the propositional attitudes by Coleman, Keith
On the Propositional Attitudes 
KEITH COLEMAN 
The University of Kansas 
An adequate account of the nature of the so called 'propositional 
attitudes' has long been sought by philosophers of mind, and most 
theories which have been proposed have suffered from certain logical or 
epistemological defects or have been limited in scope. The issues 
centering around the nature of beliefs, desires, and the other attitudes 
pertain to two principal areas of investigation: the explication of a 
(psychological) theory concerning the objects of the propositional attitudes 
and the analysis of the logical structure of such sentences as those with the 
form 'A believes that p' or 'A wishes (desires) that p.' My main concern in 
this paper is with problems associated with the latter endeavor. Such 
problems in an important respect are more basic, for a successful attempt 
at characterizing the typical form of sentences that express propositional 
attitudes must be made before any theory about the objects of beliefs, 
desires, and other intentions can possibly take shape.1 
The sentence "Jones believes that there are unicorns" has the typical 
form of the members of a class of sentences each one consisting of one or 
more names or denoting phrases followed by an intentional idiom of the 
kind 'believes that', 'desires that', 'wishes that', 'hopes that', 'fears that', 
'says that', 'wonders whether', etc. followed by a complete sentence. Such 
complex sentences when taken as assertions have usually been seen as 
expressing a relationship (or a propositional attitude) of one kind or 
another between an object (usually a person) and a belief, desire, wish, 
hope, or other intention (or object of the propositional attitude). For the 
sake of facilitating the discussion regarding these sentences, I shall, with a 
certain degree of liberty, call such idioms consisting of the word 'that' 
preceded by a verb of intention 'proposing phrases'; 1 seek then an 
analysis of the role such phrases have in determining the logical form of 
sentences in which they occur. I will begin my account by specifying the 
logical requirements any such analysis must meet and then briefly 
examine some of the proposed analyses (each one of which I believe fails 
to satisfy at least one requirement) and then end by presenting and 
justifying my analysis, which, hopefully, does meet these requirements. 
1 1 use the words 'intention' and 'intentional' where I have in mind words or 
sentence fragments that refer to the propositional attitudes or to the so-
called objects of these attitudes. As will be pointed out later, intentional 
contexts are often intcnsional (i.e., non-cxtensional). 
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I 
In an interesting, albeit somewhat lengthy, article, Jerry Fodor 
carefully delineates a scries of conceptual conditions which must be 
satisfied by any theory dealing with propositional attitudes. Although 
Fodor is primarily concerned with developing a theory that will eventually 
mesh with the empirical results of cognitive psychology (the first of the 
endeavors previously mentioned), many of his observations are relevant to 
the analysis of the inferential structure of sentences containing proposing 
phrases. The questions concerning logical form are not always easy to 
separate from the questions associated with the structure and nature of 
the empirical or conceptual theories of the propositional attitudes, but in 
what follows I will try to focus solely on issues pertaining to the former. 
Many of my remarks in the next few paragraphs have their origins in 
Fodor's paper. 
First of all, the surface grammar of typical sentences of the kind in 
question would seem to indicate, under a fairly natural reading, that 
proposing phrases, as was noted above, introduce a two place relation 
between something that can have (or enter into) a propositional attitude 
and what has been called the 'object* or the 'content' of the attitude. The 
embedded sentence of the 'that'-clause then reveals the (propositional) 
content of the particular attitude. Syntactically, any such sentence can be 
constructed from a singular term, a proposing phrase, and a sentence.2 
Where 'R' represents a proposing phrase and a is any term and p is any 
sentence, we have raRp~} as the apparent form of such a sentence. The 
trouble with this rendering of proposing phrases is that it does not accord 
well with any standard first order language. There simply are no sentence 
forming operators on names and sentences. 'R' cannot be a sentential 
connective, if for no other reason than that a is a term (name or denoting 
phrase) and not a sentence. In addition, p is a sentence and hence does 
not denote an object3, so that its occurrence in the complex sentence 
seems out of place. In spite of all this, the inclination to treat 'R' as a 
relation is re-enforced when one considers that by interchanging the 
2 There are some sentences that do not contain proposing phrases but 
nevertheless can be regarded as synonymous with at least one sentence 
that does contain such a phrase. As Quine has pointed out, a sentence 
such as "I want a sloop" is equivalent to the sentence "I desire that I have a 
sloop." Similar transformations for other sentences of the same general 
type would seem to be available. 
3 If one were to agree with Frege and take a sentence as referring to its 
truth value, then a sentence such as "Tom believes that it is raining" would 
express a relationship between Tom and a truth value, but this obviously is 
not what this sentence is about. 
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positions of a and p the complex, rpRa "\ if even meaningful, docs not 
in general have the same sense as raRp~l, and yet for every 'R' there is a 
related construction 'R*' such that rp R*a 1 is true iff ra Rp is true. 
For example, if the sentence "Jones believes that unicorns exist" is true, 
then, despite the fact that "Unicorns exist believes that Jones" is not 
meaningful, the sentence That unicorns exist is believed by Jones" is both 
meaningful and true. This parallels the account that can be given of more 
common place relations: for instance, if "Susan loves Bill" is true, then "Bill 
is loved by Susan" is also true. It is difficult, then, on the one hand, to treat 
a proposing phrase as anything other than a two-place predicate; however, 
on the other hand, the exact manner in which the term and the embedded 
sentence are linked by the proposing phrase needs to be clarified. If the 
linkage cannot be made with the logical apparatus of a first order 
language, then this would indicate the need for a more enriched language. 
The relational aspect of proposing phrases is also apparent in the kind 
of inferences which can be made from sentences containing such phrases. 
Consider the following sentence. 
(1) Joe believes that Tom is a jerk. 
It can be concluded from (1), by existential generalization, that 
(2) Joe believes something is true. What this means is that quantification 
over the position occupied by the 'that'-clause is permissible so that the 
noun clause is also functioning from a logical perspective as a denoting 
expression. This again indicates that the proposing phrase (or at least a 
part of it) is a two-place predicate. The story is further complicated, though, 
by the fact that from (1) it follows that 
(3) Joe believes something about Tom. 
If the 'that'-clause in (1) denotes the sentence Tom is a jerk", then the 
inference from (1) to (3) is reasonable since sentences can be 
characterized by their subject. The inference is nonetheless unusual since 
the property of the sentence could be inferred from (1), seemingly without 
any additional assumptions, just by the form of the 'that'- clause. It's also 
true from (1) and the sentence, 
(4) Mary believes that Tom is not a jerk 
that Mary and Joe disagree about Tom. In this case, however, additional 
assumptions about what constitutes a disagreement are needed. 
Furthermore, if Tom is a jerk" is true, then from (1) we can conclude not 
only (3) but also, 
(5) Joe believes something true about Tom. 
These last few observations suggest that what is referred to by the 'that'-
clause is a sentence, a sentence which can immediately take part in 
subsequent derivations. 
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If we take a proposing phrase as introducing a relation between a 
person and a sentence,4 then we can understand the similarities between 
sentences of the form 'A says that p' and sentences of the form 'A says 'p", 
but we must account for both the similarities and the obvious differences 
between these forms of, respectively, indirect and direct discourse. 
Although both of the sentences, 
(6) Galileo said, 'The earth moves'* 
(7) Galileo said that the earth moves 
appear to be expressing a relation between Galileo and a sentence,5 
neither the truth values (in this case) nor the deductive consequences arc 
quite the same. Since Galileo did not speak English, (6) is, literally, false, 
but (7) is true. Although (6) can plausibly be said to entail (7), and hence 
every sentence it entails, (7) and, at least ostensibly, every sentence it 
entails does not, jointly nor individually, entail (6). The inference, then, 
from (7) to (6) would be illicit. Also, the sentence "Galileo said something" 
seems to follow directly from (6) and also from (7). However, it should be 
noted that the inference from (6) to (7) depends on an assumption about 
how Galileo's saying should be interpreted. If he were merely joking, for 
instance, then his saying of (6) would not constitute a legitimate assertion 
and thereby would not be a 'saying that' (where a 'saying that' is an 
assertion about the content of what was said in the assertoric mode). There 
is also another kind of asymmetry between the logical consequences of 
'sayings' on the one hand and of 'sayings that' on the other. Consider the 
following sentences. 
(8) George said. There are unicorns in Georgia." 
(9) George said, "In Georgia, there are unicorns." 
(10) George said that there are unicorns in Georgia. 
(11) George said that in Georgia there are unicorns. 
4 The manner in which we understand this relationship as obtaining does 
not really matter in the discussion to follow. There are perhaps many ways 
a psychological theory could in principle provide content to this relation. 
My only point here is that the logical structure of sentences containing 
proposing phrases seems to require that we take such sentences as 
asserting some kind of relationship between an object and a sentence. A 
psychological theory may even end up positing entities that are said to be 
the objects of the propositional attitudes or may even correlate, or identify, 
the propositional attitudes with certain definite mental or physical states. 
5 The relations referred to in the two sentences cannot be the same. The 
relation that will obtain if (6) is true holds between Galileo and one 
particular sentence, whereas the relation that will obtain if (7) is true holds 
between Galileo and any sentence synonymous with the particular 
sentence referred to in (6). Beyond this, how we construe these relations 
does not really matter. See note 3. 
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Sentences (10) and (11) entail one another, while sentences (8) and (9) do 
not. (10) and (11) may indeed be considered synonymous, while (8) and (9) 
appear similar but not synonymous. These observations suggest that there 
are logical and non-logical relations between types of sentences 
exemplified by (6) and (7), and, hence, any account of the logical nature of 
such sentences must render these relations explicit. 
Perhaps the most celebrated feature of proposing phrases is that in 
many cases they set up intentional contexts into which quantification 
cannot proceed and within which substitutions of co-referring terms will 
not in general preserve truth values. As an example of the former, if Joe 
fancies that only the present king of France is bald, then the sentence, 
(12) Joe believes that the present king of France is bald 
is true, whereas the sentence, in partial symbolic dress, 
(13) (3x)(Joe believes that x is bald) 
is false. Hence, (12) cannot be said to entail (13). As an example of the 
failure of the substitutivity principle, consider the following pair of 
sentences. 
(14) Joe believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckleberry Finn. 
(15) Joe believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckleberry Finn. 
Even though Mark Twain is Samuel Gemens, (14) may very well be true 
without (15) being true. Joe, for instance, may have an extensive knowledge 
of American literature but not know who Samuel Clemens was. 
Our translations into canonical notation of sentences expressive of 
propositional attitudes must explain why such intentional contexts are 
referentially opaque. Although this opacity has traditionally been regarded 
as one of the distinguishing features of these types of sentences and is the 
main reason for their logical intractability, the intentional contexts that 
proposing phrases introduce are not always completely opaque. For 
instance, (14) could be said to entail (15) if the sentence, 
(16) Joe believes that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens 
were true and we made certain rationality assumptions about the 
completeness and coherency of Joe's belief system. More specifically, if 
Joe's belief set were closed under the logical consequence relation, i.e. if 
Joe believes whatever is entailed by any combination of Joe's other beliefs, 
then (14) and (16) would jointly entail (15). Also, if we were to regard, for 
some reason or other, the sentences following the 'that'-clauses in (14) and 
(15) as synonymous, (14) and (15) would both be true, or both be false 
However it is, then, that we finally analyze the logical nature of intensional 
contexts must account for the degree of, and not the mere fact of, the 
opacity which they introduce. 
II 
Quinc has contended that at least for the propositional attitudes of 
believing, desiring, and striving there are two different modes in which one 
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could be said to have such an attitude.6 These correspond to the two 
different senses attached to a sentence such as, 
(17) Ralph believes that there are spies. 
If Ralph's believing is in the notional sense, then (17) can be paraphrased 
as, 
(18) Ralph believes that there is someone such that that person is a spy. 
On the other hand, if Ralph's belief is understood in the relational sense, 
then (17) would be paraphrased as, 
(19) There is someone of whom Ralph believes to be a spy. 
The important difference between (18) and (19) which would affect the way 
in which sentence (17) would be translated into a canonical notation 
concerns the extent to which it is possible to quantify into the 'that'-clause 
in (17). The *bclieves that'-clause of (18) can be understood as referring to a 
dyadic relation between a person and a sentence (or proposition) held 
true, whereas the corresponding 'believes that'-clause in (19) can be 
understood as referring to a triadic relation between two people and a 
property. Quine thus renders (18) and (19) as, respectively, 
(20) Ralph believes that [there is someone who is a spy) 
(21) (3x)(Ralph believes y(y is a spy) of x). 
Quine later, in an attempt to eliminate reference to properties (such as y(y 
is a spy): the property of being a spy), suggests that even (21) could be 
understood as asserting that a relation holds between two objects and a 
sentence. In this case, Ralph could be said to believe that a sentence is 
satisfied by some object. In Word and Object, Quine then dispenses with 
even the reference to sentences by fusing the proposing phrase in a 
sentence like (20) to the embedded sentence and the intensional verb in a 
sentence like (21) to the predicate abstraction to form in both cases 
complex predicate expressions. Sentence (20) would be rendered into 
canonical notation using a one-place predicate, and (21) would be 
translated by using a dyadic predicate. In simplified form, (20) and (21) 
would appear as, 
(22) Bia 
(23) (3x)B2ax 
David Kaplan has pointed out a difficulty with Quine's analysis of 
believing in the relational sense.7 Kaplan charged Quine with being 
inconsistent when he failed to rule out constructions like (21) and (23) in 
regard to intentional belief contexts but did rule out similar constructions 
in regard to non-extensional modal contexts. In order to see what is wrong 
with these symbolic versions of the relational sense of (17), consider the 
following sentence. 
(24) Holmes believes that someone is the murderer. 
6 This is done in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes". 
7 See Kaplan's essay, "Quantifying In". 
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If the believing mentioned in this sentence is taken to be in the relational 
sense, then (24) can be rendered according to Quine as, 
(25) QxXHolmes believes y(y is the murderer) of x). 
However, the wrong idea of the relational sense of (24) is given by (25). If 
Holmes were only to believe, for instance, that among the several guests at 
the hotel one of them was the murderer, and hence believed that the hotel 
guest who committed the murder is the murderer, and if the murderer, 
whoever that should be, was in fact a hotel guest, then (25) would be true, 
whereas the relational sense of (24) is that there is some particular 
individual of whom it can be said that Holmes believes him or her to be 
the murderer.8 In other words, as long as Holmes is familiar with the 
8 If Holmes either believed that the hotel guest who committed the 
murder is the murderer or believed that the murder is the murderer, then 
(25) would be true on the assumption that there is a unique individual who 
committed the murder and that individual is also a hotel guest. If the 
definite description in both cases is treated as a name, then we would 
have, respectively, where 'the hotel guest who committed the murder' is 'h' 
and 'the murderer' is'm', 
(I) Holmes believes that h = m 
or 
(II) Holmes believes that m = m. 
Since both 'h' and'm' denote some one individual, either one of these 
sentences entails the sentence, in Quine's notation, 
(III) QxXHolmes believes y(y = m) of x), 
so (25) is entailed by either one of them. If we were to analyze the definite 
description in the traditional Russellian fashion, we would obtain, instead 
of (I), 
(IV) Holmes believes that (3z)(3x)(((z is a hotel guest & z committed the 
murder) & (Vw)((w is a hotel guest & w committed the murder)—»z = w)) 
&((x committed the murder &c (Vu)(u committed the murder-* x = u)) & z 
= x)), 
and, instead of (II), 
(V) Holmes believes that (3z)((z committed the murder & (Vw)(w 
committed the murder—»z = w))&z=z). 
Now, although this is certainly less obvious than the previous derivation, 
since there is some one individual who committed the murder (and is also 
a hotel guest) and Holmes believes this, from (IV) it follows that Holmes 
believes of someone that that individual both is the hotel guest who is the 
murderer and is the murderer, so we obtain 
(VI) (3x)(Holmcs believes that y(((y is a hotel guest & y committed the 
murder) & (Vw)((w is a hotel guest & w committed the murder)—*y = w)) & 
(y committed the murder & (Vu)(u committed the murder—>y = u))) of x). 
144 AUSLEGUNG 
murderer under some description, regardless of how vague, and there is 
someone who satisfies that description, (25) is true. In contrast, if (24), 
understood relationally, were true, then the mystery would be solved and 
the arrest could be made; this meaning is not what is suggested by (25). 
In order to fully state the relational sense of (24), Kaplan introduces 
the notion of a 'vivid name': a name is vivid for a person, roughly, iff, on the 
assumptions that the name denotes because it is appropriately linked 
causally with what it denotes and that the name adequately picks out or 
describes its referent, then it follows that the person knows exactly what or 
whom it denotes. The idea here is that in order for it to be truly said that 
Holmes believes of some particular individual that he is the murderer 
Holmes must be sufficiently acquainted with the murderer such that he 
knows precisely who the murderer is. Only under these conditions would 
(24) in the relational sense be true. If Holmes were acquainted with the 
murderer only by knowing that he can be referred to by some description, 
say, 'the hotel guest who is taller than five feet and who committed the 
murder,' then (25), but not (24) would be true. As Holmes accumulated 
more evidence, if a time was reached at which Holmes was acquainted 
with the murderer by having such a detailed description of him that 
Holmes could, say, pick him out of a line up, then that description would 
be sufficiently vivid for Holmes so that he could be said to believe of 
someone that he is the murderer and (24), understood in the relational 
sense, would be true. Instead of (25), the symbolic version of (24) in 
Kaplan's notation is, 
(26) (3x)(3a)(R(a, x. Holmes) & Holmes B r a = the murderer"1), 
where quantification is over objects and names and 'R(a, x. Holmes)' 
means 'a represents x to Holmes' and 'Holmes B r a = the murderer1' 
means that Holmes believes that the referent of 'a' and the murderer are 
the same. The expression ' r a = the murderer1' is a complex name that 
refers to the expression 'a = the murderer' in terms of its syntax. The 
predicates 'R' and 'B' refer to relations between an expression and one or 
more objects, and 'R' is defined in such a fashion that any value of 'a', 
which will be an expression, that satisfies the propositional function *R(a, x. 
Likewise, from (V) we obtain 
(VII) (Bx)(Holmes believes that y(y committed the murder & (Vw)(w 
committed the murder—* y=w)) of x). 
We can then rewrite (VI) as 
(VIII) (3x)(Holmes believes that y(y is the hotel guest who committed the 
murder & y is the murderer) of x) 
and (VII) as 
(IX) (3x)(Holmes believes that y(y is the murderer) of x), 
which is (25). Presumably, although I find this a specious inference, (VIII) 
also entails (25). 
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Holmes)' will be a vivid name of x for Holmes. Kaplan argued that such a 
complicated apparatus was needed in order to correctly render the 
relational sense of belief. 
It should perhaps be noted that in this regard Quine's handling of the 
distinction between the notional and relational senses of belief is very 
similar to Bertrand Russell's treatment9 of the difference between, 
respectively, the secondary occurrence of a definite description and the 
primary occurrence of the description in such a sentence as, 
(27) George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly. 
Although Kaplan is concerned with making clear the relational sense of 
believing while Russell is concerned with rejecting an analogous sense of 
wishing to know, Kaplan's observation that Quine has failed to capture in 
his notation the essential features of this distinction in the case of the two 
senses of belief parallels the observation that Russell was unable to specify 
the precise nature of George lV's wonderment in his two paraphrases of 
(27). If the definite description is given a primary occurrence (i.e., a wide 
scope), then (27) is rendered as 
(28) (3x)((x wrote Waverly & (Vy)(y wrote Waverly ->x = y)) & George IV 
wished to know whether x = Scott). 
If the definite description is given a secondary occurrence (i.e., a narrow 
scope), then (27) is rendered as 
(29) George IV wished to know whether (3x)((x wrote Waverly & (Vy)(y 
wrote Waverly —» x = y)) & x = Scott). 
The quantification in (28) is into an intentional context so that this symbolic 
version of (27) expresses what may be called the relational sense of wishing 
to know, whereas (29) expresses the notional sense of wishing to know. 
There are obvious similarities between (28) and (21) on the one hand and 
between (29) and (20) on the other. If George IV were wanting to know 
about the law of identity (that is, whether Scott is Scott) and the author of 
Waverly were Scott, then (28) would be true. Russell came to reject (28) as 
giving the probable meaning of (27) since (28) would also be true in the 
case where the author of Waverly was Scott and George IV had seen Scott 
faintly in the distance and wished only to know whether the person seen 
faintly in the distance was Scott. Both of these difficulties with (28) are 
analogous to the difficulties Kaplan claimed made Quine's rendering of 
(17) as (21) unacceptable. 
The trouble with (29) is less apparent, but there is still a problem. 
Unfortunately, the embedded sentence in (29) also docs not represent the 
exact extent of George lV's wonderment.10 Notwithstanding the 
differences between the primary and the secondary occurrence of the 
91 am, of course, referring to Russell's early paper, "On Denoting". 
io On this point, I owe a debt of gratitude to Donald Brownstein, who 
originally suggested to me that Russell's rendition of (27) with a secondary 
occurrence of the definite description was incorrect. 
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definite description, (27), again depending upon how it is interpreted, 
would be true in two further distinct cases in only one of which would (29) 
be true. The first case involves poor George IV pondering the question of 
the origin of Waverly and wishing to know whether Scott was solely 
responsible for it in virtue of being Waverly 's sole author. The second case 
involves a more attentive George IV either knowing or taking it for granted 
that there is one and only one person who wrote Waverly but wishing to 
know whether or not Scott is that author. The first case corresponds with 
what is expressed by (29), but the more likely meaning of (27) is such that 
only if the conditions of the second case were to obtain would (27) be true. 
The trouble with (29), then, is that too much of the meaning of the definite 
description is brought into the intensional context; the trouble with (28), on 
the other hand, is that too little of the meaning of the definite description is 
brought into the intensional context. 
However, even neglecting the difficulties involved in making sense 
out of the notional versus the relational senses of belief, there is a more 
telling reason for not accepting Quine's account. By bracketing off, or by 
fusing, the embedded sentence or predicate expression, respectively, to 
the proposing phrase or verb in order to form a complicated predicate, one 
blocks most of the deductive consequences of the types of sentences we 
have been considering. For example, the inferences from (1) to (2), from (1) 
to (3), and from (10) to (11) would all be illicit. The only way these inferences 
could be permitted as sound is through the addition of an indefinite 
number of non-logical axioms, or perhaps a finite number of axiom 
schema, which would, problematically, have to be stated in terms of the 
internal structure of the complex predicate. This, of course, among other 
things is counter-intuitive, for it would appear that the inferences 
mentioned above would need no such non-logical support. Furthermore, 
since the fused predicate expressions would have no logically significant 
internal structure and would therefore have to be looked upon as 
(logically) simple monadic or dyadic predicates, this move would be 
unwarranted since the inferences they support must turn on this internal 
structure.11 
Donald Davidson took a different approach to the problem.12 A 
sentence such as (7) consists of two sentences juxtaposed; the first 
sentence mentions what was said by using the demonstrative 'that' to refer 
to the second sentence, which appears after the 'that' merely to provide 
the content to what is referred to by the 'that'. The entire construction 
reports the content of what someone has said, regardless of how they said 
it or in what language it was said. This is so because the utterance of the 
1 1 However, with regard to its syntax, such a fused predicate expression is 
nonetheless grammatically complex. See Quine's discussion in Chapter 2 
of Philosophy of Logic. 
1 2 See Davidson's essays, 'Thought and Talk" and "On Saying That". 
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words following the word 'that' is understood to be an utterance of a 
sentence in the reporter's language synonymous with the sentence in the 
subject's language which the subject's utterance (which represents a 
saying of the same thing said by the reporter) is an utterance of. In other 
words, a sentence like (7) is true iff there is some utterance that was, in this 
case, made by Galileo such that Galileo's saying and the reporter's current 
saying (i.e., the utterance of "the earth moves") make Galileo and the 
reporter samesayers. For Davidson, any theory giving an account of the 
nature of sentences expressing propositional attitudes must treat these 
sentences, and any of the other sentences of the language in which they 
occur, in a fashion that will allow truth to be defined in a Tarski-like 
manner.13 That is, the truth conditions of any sentence of the language 
must be recursively specifiable in terms of the truth conditions of the 
subsentential parts and must take into account the role played by all truth 
affecting iterative devices in the language. The trouble with the fusion 
theory of the propositional attitudes is that it does not satisfy this criterion. 
Since any sentence may follow the proposing phrase in a complex 
sentence containing one, the strategy of fusing the proposing phrase with 
the embedded sentence would result in an infinite number of logically 
simple predicates, and it is hard to see how, on this account, the truth 
conditions of sentences containing proposing phrases could be 
characterizable in terms of the truth conditions of their component parts. 
Learning a fused predicate language would also present difficulties: in 
order to learn the meaning of a potential infinity of complex sentences 
containing such predicate expressions, one would have to learn in each 
case how the meaning of the complex sentence is determined by the 
meanings of both the proposing phrase (since that construction 
determines which propositional attitude is being expressed) and the 
embedded sentence (since that sentence determines the 'content' of the 
propositional attitude). On Davidson's view, the meaning of any sentence 
is only specifiable, ultimately, in terms of its truth conditions, but the 
meaning of the complex sentence could not be given in terms that include, 
among other things, the truth conditions of the embedded sentence since 
the syntactically complex predicate is nonetheless logically simple in 
virtue of its inferential structure. 
Davidson's thesis does account for the referential opacity of the 
embedded sentence in the 'that'-clause; the fact that on the fusion theory 
this opacity is readily apparent is probably the only good reason for 
accepting it. Since the meaning of a sentence, or, more to the point, the 
relations of synonymy, may change upon any type of substitution, the 
meaning of the sentence following the proposing phrase may not be 
preserved upon the substitution of co-referring terms. It is this component 
1 3 Sec Tarski's essay, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth and the 
Foundations of Semantics", or Chapter 3 of Quine's Philosophy of Logic. 
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sentence, of course, which determines what the complex sentence is 
ultimately to be understood as asserting; therefore, substitutions into the 
former may affect what the latter is about, or its informational content, in 
that the referent of 'that', i.e., the utterance of the embedded sentence, 
may change. Also, since the sentence the utterance of which is referred to 
by 'that' is semantically independent of the sentence consisting of the 
proposing phrase and everything before it, the truth or falsity of the former 
sentence has no bearing on the truth or falsity of the latter sentence. 
Therefore, when one says that something, one is not asserting the 
something but merely reporting on it; the something may be true or false 
quite independently of the veracity of the report. This is, of course, the way 
it should be. 
Although Davidson's proposal is attractive in many ways and it allows 
him to circumvent some serious logical/conceptual problems, it too does 
not satisfy all the requirements an adequate account must meet. On 
Davidson's own admission, the sentence in the 'that'-clause is semantically 
inert and merely occurs in this context so that the utterance of the words 
following 'that' provides a referent for the demonstrative, so it is hard to 
see how inferences could be drawn from the content of the syntactically 
embedded sentence. Also, since sayings that, according to this view, are 
reports on utterances (in the case of the spoken word) or inscriptions, 
presumably, (in the case of the written word),14 just how are we to 
understand the relation of synonymy between the reporter's words and the 
subject's word's, for only sentences, not objects, have meaning. Only 
sentences, and not utterances construed as objects, have truth values. It 
appears that we again need non-logical axioms (this time, stated in terms 
of relations between utterances and sentences) in order for us to be able to 
derive the logical consequences from what was said. 
What is even more at the heart of the matter here is that on 
Davidson's account the meaning of the component sentence is only 
relevant in determining, in an indirect fashion, the actual truth value of 
particular complex sentences but is not pertinent to the meaning of the 
complex sentence. For Davidson, as far as the logical structure of the 
complex sentence is concerned, the complex sentence stops with the word 
'that.' This demonstrative functions as a name so that its reference is 
needed in particular cases to determine whether a (syntactically, not 
logically) complex sentence is true or false. The semantics of the complex 
sentence, though, cannot be separable in this manner from the semantics 
of the embedded sentence, for one cannot be said to know the meaning of 
a complex sentence without knowing the meaning of its embedded 
1 4 The fact that 'that' may refer to spoken or written words within a 
sentence which is either written or spoken means either that the meaning 
of a 'says that' construction is partially determined by context or that we 
need a broad interpretation of the word 'utterance'. 
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sentence. The situation is different in the case of simple sentences 
containing names, where knowledge of the referent of the name is not 
required for knowledge of the sense, or meaning, of the sentence but is 
required in order to grasp fully the informational content of the sentence 
and to assess its truth value. Furthermore, since a complex sentence 
containing the proposing phrase 'said that' is about the same-saying 
relationship, which involves the relation of synonymy among sentences, 
and makes reference to a sentence, indirectly by making direct reference 
to an utterance which in turn is related by an appropriate theory to a 
sentence, the relationship between the embedded sentence and the 
remaining portion of the complex sentence must be the relation of an 
object language to a metalanguage. If the traditional relation between an 
object language and an associated metalanguage is upheld, then the truth 
conditions of the component sentence are not part of the truth conditions 
of the complex sentence since a specification of the truth conditions of the 
latter sentence will involve only a name of, and not the content of, an 
utterance of the former sentence. This means that the truth conditions, 
and hence meaning, of the complex sentence cannot be stated in terms of 
the truth conditions, and hence meaning, of all of its relevant parts so that 
Davidson's own account also fails to meet the standard concerning the 
amenability to a Tarski-like truth definition which Davidson himself 
explicitly acknowledges must be satisfied by any such theory. 
Davidson's theory dealt only with sentences of the form of (7), (10), and 
(11); it is unclear whether or not his account can be extended to cover 
sentences expressive of the other propositional attitudes. An account of 
believing that parallel to the account of saying that would construe the 
referent of 'that' in a sentence containing the proposing phrase 'believes 
that' as the utterance of the words following 'that', and the sentence 
containing the proposing phrase would be true just in case an utterance of 
the person reported on is such that the current utterance of the words 
following the word 'that' in the 'that'- clause of the reporter make reporter 
(if he were to have the same belief as the subject) and subject 
'samebelicvers'. However, consider the following conversation between 
two people who up to this time have never said anything disparaging about 
one another. 
Joe says (to Tom), "You are a jerk." 
Tom says (to Joe), "Yes, 1 have always believed that you are a jerk." 
Tom's utterance of the words "You are a jerk" are not the words he should 
have to utter if he and Joe shared the same belief, even though Joe also 
utters these words, if for no other reason than that the word 'you' in the 
mouths of the two speakers does not refer to the same person, in addition, 
Tom's current utterance of the words "You. are a jerk" cannot, by 
hypothesis, be associated with a past utterance of Tom in virtue of which 
he now asserts that he believes the same thing as he did in the past. 
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Now, consider a modification of the above case with the conversation 
proceeding instead as follows, 
joe says (to Tom): "You are a jerk." 
Tom says (to Joe): "I believe that." 
Presumably, Joe and Tom are in agreement here. But to what 
utterance does Tom's utterance of the word 'that' refer? It cannot refer, 
again by hypothesis, to any remark that Tom has made in the past. If it 
should refer to Joe's utterance of "You are a jerk", then it would appear that 
Tom has, in effect, used Joe's utterance to make a personal comment 
about Joe, but this does not seem to be what has transpired in this 
conversation. On the contrary, Tom appears to be admitting here that he 
believes what Joe says about him, and what Joe says about him is that Tom 
is a jerk. Thus, Joe's utterance, once the antecedent of the pronoun 'you' is 
understood in the context of Joe's utterance, can be construed as an 
utterance of the sentence 'Tom is a jerk", and, as a result, the utterance of 
'that' in the context of Tom's utterance can be seen as a reference to this 
sentence. In other words, the word 'that' in the mouth of Tom does not 
refer to the utterance of Joe but refers to the sentence of which Joe's 
utterance is, in effect, an utterance of. 
A consideration of a host of similar cases reveals the inadequacy of a 
'Davidsonian' type of approach to analyzing sentences of the form 'A 
believes that p'. 1 5 Davidson's account of 'saying that', even if it were 
successful, is limited in scope and evidently docs not provide us with the 
key to understanding the nature of the rest of the proposing phrases. We 
desire to have an account of all the propositional attitudes and hence 
should prefer a theory that gives a complete account over one that merely 
gives a partial analysis. 
Ill 
The positive and negative arguments thus far presented support a 
view which I now wish to advocate. Firstly, at least some sentences 
containing proposing phrases represent one type of sentence which has a 
logical structure best understood as relating an object and a sentence. 
Since such sentences contain syntactically embedded sentences which are 
nevertheless semantically significant, we must reject any view that always 
regards the occurrence of the embedded sentence as an 'orthographic 
1 5 Of course, simpler examples could have been given here to indicate the 
trouble with such an account of 'believing that'. If the 'believing that' 
relation were analogous to Davidson's 'saying that' relation, then it would 
mean that we could only attribute a belief to a person who had in fact 
made an appropriate utterance. 1 chose the above examples both to 
illustrate the difficulties with this approach and to suggest, at least in part, 
what the true nature of this relation is. 
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accident', as Quine puts it, or as an occupier of a logical lacuna. Both 
Quine's account and Davidson's account must be discounted on this 
score. Davidson considered the grammar of sentences containing 
proposing phrases as misleading. That'-clauscs, instead of referring in one 
way or another to sentences as they appear to do (since, for one reason, 
they arc noun clauses and seem to name or refer to their embedded 
sentences or to the content of such sentences), make reference to 
utterances, or, more precisely, the 'that' in the noun clause is a 
demonstrative which refers to the utterance of the rest of the clause. 
Davidson argued that, if what followed the word 'that' referred instead to a 
sentence, then the replacement of the embedded sentential construction, 
which is understood to be both the (unstated) quotation of the embedded 
sentence and also the presumed sentential referent of the demonstrative, 
by a description of the sentence in terms of its syntax should not affect the 
sense of the resulting complex sentence. In other words, if we were to 
replace the embedded sentence "the earth moves" in (7) by a description 
of it in terms of the arrangement of its component symbols to obtain 
(30) Galileo said that k't,k*h'k'e'k'-'k,e,k'a'k'r'k't'k'h*k'-*k'm'k'o'kVk,e"s', 
where 'k' is 'the concatenation of... with...', then the sense of (30) should not 
differ from that of (7). Since in general, and in this case in particular, the 
resulting sentence, if it indeed has any meaning at all, does not, of course, 
have a meaning that resembles anything like that of the original, the 
supposition that the referent of the two components of the 'that'-clause is 
the embedded sentence must be false. Although this line of reasoning 
correctly shows that the embedded sentence cannot be functioning as an 
appositive, this argument, I believe, misses the mark. The word 'that' in (7) 
functions similar to a name forming operator on the sentence "the earth 
moves" to form a name-like expression (or a 'quasiname') that refers to the 
sentence "the earth moves"; hence, the substitution of the syntactical 
description of the sentence for the actual syntactical construction in the 
name-like expression of the sentence produces what appears to be (and is) 
not a complex sentence but a meaningless string of symbols. Davidson 
has mistakenly attributed to the view that in sentences such as (7) 
reference is being made to a sentence, and not an utterance, that it entails 
taking the embedded sentence as a sentence that is a name for itself. 
Davidson's argument can be resuscitated, however, if it is claimed 
that a sentence with a completely different sense, if any sense at all, results 
from (7) upon the substitution of the syntactical description of the 
sentence for the entire 'that'-clause. However, the removal of the word 
'that' in (7) changes the nature of the relationship between the subject and 
the embedded sentence. In other words, the word 'that' in the proposing 
phrase 'said that' both sets up a context in which the sentence following 
'that' is referred to and figures in the specification of the relation referred 
to by the predicate expression. Yet, it may still be claimed that the 
substitution of the syntactical description of the quoted sentence in (6) for 
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the entire expression composed of that sentence together with its 
quotation marks yields the same problematic sentence as was generated 
from (7). Does not this indicate that a sentence such as (6) is about a 
relation between a person and an utterance? And if this is the case, then, 
since a saying and a saying that are conceptually very similar, must a 
sentence such as (7) also be understood as expressing a relation between a 
person and an utterance? Negative answers can be given to both of these 
questions. If it were true that a sentence such as (6) expressed a relation 
between a person and an utterance, with the quotation being a name of 
the utterance, then the substitution in (6) of a description of a particular 
acoustical event constituting an utterance of the quoted sentence for the 
quoted sentence with its quotation marks should not alter the meaning of 
the original sentence. This, of course, is false, so by a counter-argument 
the construal of such a sentence as likewise involving a reference to an 
utterance must also be misguided. 
The quoted sentence in (6) occurs in a context in which that sentence 
is being referred to, and the quotation marks serve both to signal that 
context and to form a name-like expression for the quoted sentence. This 
quasiname is a construction that occupies the grammatical position of a 
name but does not function like an ordinary name. Whereas there is no 
logical connection between a logically proper name and the object that the 
name refers to, the quasiname, whose construction constitutes a separate 
logical category, refers to a sentence in virtue of the connection in 
meaning and syntactical expression between the sentence and any 
complex sentence that contains the same quasiname. The reference to an 
object made by an ordinary singular term is what I call 'objectual 
reference', while the reference to a sentence made by such a quasiname is 
what I call 'substitutional reference'. A sentence containing the 
quasiname, which is a sentence of the metalanguage, does not treat the 
sentence referred to, which is a sentence of the object language, as an 
object since there are inferential links between the corresponding 
metalanguage and object language sentences. Both (6) and (7) contain 
quasinames of the sentence "The earth moves", and this common feature 
explains in part the similarity between these two sentences. The reason 
that substitution of a syntactical description for the embedded sentence 
does not preserve the sense of the original sentence is the same in the 
case of (6) as in the case of (7): when the embedded sentence (with or 
without its quotation marks or the word 'that') is removed, the quasiname 
in the original sentence is obliterated and meaning thus is not preserved. 
The relation asserted to hold between Galileo and the sentence The 
earth moves" is, however, not the same. The 'saying' relation mentioned in 
(6) would hold between Galileo and 'The earth moves" in virtue of the 
former having made an utterance of a type that represented a verbal 
expression of the latter. The 'saying that' relation mentioned in (7) holds 
between Galileo and 'The earth moves" in virtue of the former having 
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made an utterance of a type that represented a verbal (or perhaps a 
written) expression of a sentence synonymous with the latter.1* This 
explains why there is a conceptual similarity between the two kinds of 
sentences and accounts for why (6) is false and (7) is true. The 'saying' 
relation holds between a person who makes an utterance and a sentence 
with a certain syntactical structure revealed by the utterance. The 'saying 
that' relation holds between a person who makes an utterance and a 
sentence with a' certain semantical content that expresses what was meant 
by the utterance in its context. Since the syntactical features of the 
sentence referred to in a 'saying' relation are important while the 
semantical features of the sentence referred to in a 'saying that' relation 
arc important, this is why (8) docs not entail (9) and why (10) and (11) are 
mutually entailing. The reason why it is that (6) may entail (7) but (7) does 
not entail (6) is more complicated, but the above considerations constitute 
part of the explanation. The asymmetry in the inferential relations 
between these kinds of sentences is due to the nature of the conceptual 
connection between the 'saying' relation and the 'saying that' relation. 
However, when the speaker's utterance does not have its standard 
illocutionary force, the impermissibility of inferring a sentence such as (7) 
from its corresponding sentence of the form of (6) is due either to the 
objectual reference to the embedded sentence in the latter or to the 
consequent non-standard meaning of the complex sentence of the former. 
Relations that can hold among sentences or between objects and 
sentences (such as the relations introduced by proposing phrases) do so 
obtain in virtue of the syntax or the semantics, or a combination of both, of 
the sentences substitutional^ / referred to, and, in spite of the fact that only 
one of these features of the embedded sentence may be relevant to 
particular relations, where substitutional reference to a sentence is made 
by an expression that expression does not make objectual reference to 
either the syntax or the semantics of the sentence. Although sometimes 
what may appear to be a case of substitutional reference is actually a case 
of objectual reference to an utterance, an inscription, a meaning, or a 
'proposition', substitutional reference is not eliminable in favor of 
objectual reference. Sentences can be characterized in terms of their 
syntax or their semantics, but neither one of these in isolation suffices to 
individuate sentences. We quite often use the words 'sentence', 'string', or 
'utterance' when speaking of the syntax of the sentence and use the words 
'meaning', 'proposition', or 'assertion' when speaking of the semantics of 
the sentence. The words 'statement' or 'sentence' is sometimes used when 
1 6 The 'saying that' relation thus depends for its intelligibility on the 
synonymy relation. I will not endeavor to give an account here of 
synonymy. The non-logical nature of this relation affects the non-logical 
character of the 'saying that' relation, but such considerations do not affect 
the logical form of sentences containing the proposing phrase 'said that*. 
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we wish to refer to a sentence neither solely in terms of its syntax nor solely 
in terms of its semantics. This latter is the manner in which I am using the 
word 'sentence*. When a sentence is referred to substitutional^, the 
particular object that is that sentence is never at issue. Instead, the 
(logically) complex sentence containing an expression that substitutional^ 
refers is itself connected both syntactically and semantically with its 
embedded sentence (i.e., the sentence substitutional^ referred to 
contributes both to the syntax and to the semantics of the complex 
sentence). Even though the sentence referred to appears syntactically 
within an expression that occupies the place of a name, that sentence is no 
more being treated as an object as is, for example, a conjunct in a 
conjunction. 
However, since a quasiname of the kind under consideration does 
have a referring role, quantification over the position occupied by the 
quasiname is legitimate, as long as the quasiname is not itself a part of a 
longer quasiname. When a quasiname or a proper name occurs within a 
quasiname, they occur within an opaque context in which they, in effect, 
maintain their ordinary referents but their referring role is less direct, with 
the former having what 1 call 'secondary substitutional reference' and the 
latter having what I call 'secondary objectual reference'. Quantification 
over any position occupied by an expression having a secondary referring 
role is illegitimate since such quantification is into an opaque context. 
Quantification is meaningful only when it is over a position occupied by an 
expression having a direct, or 'primary', referring role since only in such 
contexts are expressions purely cxtensional. Quantification over the 
position occupied by a term having primary objectual reference must be 
understood objcctually, whereas quantification over the position occupied 
by a quasiname having primary substitutional reference must be 
understood substitutional^. Since proposing phrases can be treated as 
introducing relations between persons and sentences, the above 
considerations account for both the inadmissibility of quantifying into the 
contexts within the embedded sentence and the admissibility of 
quantifying over the position occupied by the entire embedded sentence. 
Thus, the inference from (1) to (2) is justified, and the inference from (12) to 
(13) is not justified. Because sentences within the quasinames retain their 
integrity by not being assimilated into complex predicate expressions and 
preserve their meaning while still remaining components of complex 
sentences constructed from proposing phrases, embedded sentences can 
play a role, in certain circumstances, in deductions involving complex 
sentences about the propositional attitudes. 
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